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Abstract
We analyze two versions of a simple queuing model of resource allocation in which an
impatient citizen of a transition economy or a developing country wishes to purchase a scarce
good, namely, bread. In the first version of the model, our citizen must pay a bribe to obtain
bread immediately from a government shop. In the second version of the model, when the
government shop is too crowded, our citizen refuses to join the crowd. In other words, he
balks and goes instead to a private shop to purchase bread. In this setting, we study three
questions from the standpoint of resource allocation. First, in the presence of bribery, what is
the expected monetary benefit per citizen to a corrupt government official? Second, in the
presence of balking, what proportion of all citizens eventually get bread? Finally, and once
again in the presence of balking, what is the expected amount of time a citizen spends
waiting to get bread?
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See Goodman (1995) for a description of Romania.
2
See Gunawardana (2000) for a discussion of Sri Lanka.
3
See Wood (1999) for an account of the state of Bihar in India.
4
The classic work on shortages in socialist systems is Kornai (1980). In this book Kornai showed that chronic shortages are not
necessarily the outcome of wrong prices or incorrect planning but instead a systemic feature of socialist economies.
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1. Introduction
It is quite common in transition economies and in many developing countries to allocate goods
that are in short supply and goods deemed essential for human survival to citizens by means of




3 An essential aspect of these goods allocation mechanisms is that they involve
waiting in line by citizens. Put differently, as a matter of fact, citizens have to wait in queue to
purchase the good that is being allocated by a government shop.
In addition to government shops, it is often the case that a good in short supply, being
allocated to citizens by means of a queuing mechanism at a government shop, can also be
purchased—though often at a higher price—at one or more private shops. Here are two examples
of this phenomenon. As the Belarussian Chronicle (Anonymous 1998) has pointed out, in Minsk,
as recently as 1998, citizens frequently had to wait in long queues to buy eggs and other food
products from government shops. However, Belarussians who were both willing and able to pay
between three and eight times the mandated government price could purchase all kinds of food
products in private shops. As a second example, consider the case of Cuba. According to the
Economist (Anonymous 2003), citizens in Cuba can buy basic foods in “peso shops” or, if they have
the means, they can purchase higher quality but usually more expensive food items in the so called
“dollar shops.” 
These two examples point to the fact that in many countries, government and private shops,
often selling the same goods, frequently coexist. Given this state of affairs, it is reasonable to focus
attention on the properties of queue based resource allocation mechanisms in the presence of
government and private shops. In this regard, a number of specific questions come to mind from the
standpoint of resource allocation. First, in the presence of bribery, what is the expected monetary
benefit per citizen to a corrupt government official? Second, in the presence of balking, what
proportion of all citizens eventually get the good under study? Finally, and once again in the presence
of balking, what is the expected amount of time a customer spends waiting to get the good?
Several papers in the economics literature have analyzed questions related to the distribution
of scarce goods
4 by queuing, by rationing, and the related issue of corruption. Sah (1987) and Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) are representative. Sah (1987) formally analyzes the pros and cons of resource5
See Ross (2003, chapter 8) and Hillier and Lieberman (2005, chapter 17) for textbook accounts of Markovian queuing models.
6
Because our focus is not on this predetermined price, in the rest of this paper, with minimal implications for the analysis, we shall
abstract away from this price.
2
allocation by means of queues, rations, and the market, for poor and wealthy citizens. Shleifer and
Vishny (1993) study corruption. Although both these papers are interesting, neither paper addresses
the three questions that we have identified in the previous paragraph. In addition, neither of these two
papers make use of queuing theory even though the issues being analyzed in both these papers are
very amenable to analysis using queuing theoretic methods. 
Lui (1985) and more recently Batabyal and Nijkamp (2004) and Batabyal and Yoo (2004,
2005) have used queuing models to investigate the nexuses between bribery and corruption. Although
all four of these papers have studied aspects of the public provision of goods by means of queuing
mechanisms, these papers have not concentrated on the properties of queue based resource allocation
mechanisms in the presence of government and private shops. This (non-exhaustive) review of the
pertinent literature leads to the following conclusion. Despite the obvious relevance of the three
questions that we stated a little while ago, to the best of our knowledge, these questions have not
been analyzed previously in the economics literature. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
provide a queuing theoretic perspective on these three questions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes two versions of a
Markovian queuing model.
5 The first version of this model is discussed in greater detail in section 3
and this version contains an explicit accounting of bribery. The particular question of interest in this
section is this: In the presence of bribery, what is the expected monetary benefit per citizen to the
corrupt government official? The second version of the model is elaborated on in section 4 and this
version models the phenomenon of balking. Two specific questions are analyzed in this section: First,
what proportion of all citizens eventually get the good under study? Second, what is the expected
amount of time a citizen spends waiting to get the good? Section 5 concludes and then discusses two
ways in which the research of this paper might be extended. 
2. The Queuing Model
Consider a particular region within a transition economy or a developing country. An essential
commodity, which we suppose without loss of generality is bread, is in short supply. An impatient
citizen of this region can obtain bread in one of two ways. In the first version of our queuing model,
this citizen can either get in queue at the government shop and wait in line until it is his turn to buy
one unit of this bread at a predetermined price
6 from a corrupt public official. However, if this
impatient citizen wants his bread immediately, that is without waiting in line, then he must pay a bribe
to the public official. The nature of this bribe is described in greater detail in section 3. 
In the second version of our model, we suppose that our impatient citizen encounters too3
large a crowd at the government shop. In this case, instead of joining the crowd and/or bribing the
corrupt government official, this citizen balks. In other words, he refuses to join the crowd. Instead,
he goes to a private shop to purchase his bread, possibly at a higher price. The details of this balking
behavior are provided in section 4. 
Citizens arrive at the government shop in accordance with a Poisson process with rate   This λ.
tells us that the time between successive arrivals of citizens is exponentially distributed and, as is well
known, the exponential distribution is memoryless or Markovian. The corrupt public official takes
a random amount of time to sell bread to citizens and we suppose that this random time is
exponentially distributed with rate   Therefore, like the interarrival times of the citizens, the bread µ.
provision times are also memoryless or Markovian. Finally, in both versions of our model, there is
a single government official who sells bread. In the language of queuing theory, we are using a
prominent Markovian model, namely the   model, to analyze the three specific questions that M/M/1
we mentioned in section 1.
3. The Model With Bribing
Suppose that our impatient citizen has just arrived at the government shop to buy bread. In
the typical case, there will already be a queue of citizens waiting in line to get their bread. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that when our citizen gets to the government shop, he has n0ù
citizens ahead of him in line. Our citizen always has the choice of becoming the   person in (n%1)th
the queue. However, because this citizen is impatient and because he really wants his bread, he would
like to get his bread immediately. Now, to completely eliminate the wait time in queue, our citizen
must bribe the public official selling bread. 
The reader may be wondering why there is a queue in the first place. In the cases that we are
analyzing in this paper, there is a queue because the good in question is believed to be in short supply.
This means that if our citizen does not pay a bribe and instead waits in line then after the requisite
wait, he may or may not get his bread. Put differently, the situation we are describing is not one of
slow distribution only. It is one of slow distribution along with the potential non-receipt of bread. In
this paper, we are interested in obtaining answers to the three specific questions that we have
discussed in the last paragraph of section 1. This is why we do not explicitly account for the
possibility that the citizen may not get his bread. Having said this, we note that it is certainly possible
in our   queuing framework to model this probabilistic receipt of bread explicitly. One way to M/M/1
do this would be to analyze a   queuing model with finite capacity. Following Batabyal (2005), M/M/1
one could let an apposite public authority choose the capacity optimally so as to keep the likelihood
of the non-receipt of bread below an exogenously given level.
Now, to keep the subsequent analysis straightforward, we suppose that the magnitude of the
bribe depends on the number of citizens ahead of our citizen in a very simple way. Specifically, when
our impatient citizen sees   citizens already in queue, to obtain his one unit of bread immediately, he n
must pay a bribe of   monetary units to the public official. The reader will note that with this bribing n
function, the only way in which our impatient citizen can get bread immediately and costlessly is if4
he is the first person to arrive at the government shop. Put differently, when   the bribe is zero, n'0
and bread is purchased by our impatient citizen without any wait. 
From the standpoint of resource or bread allocation, the key question before us now is this:
What is the expected benefit to the corrupt government official in monetary units per citizen?
Answering this question essentially involves determining the mean number of citizens in the
government shop. Let us denote this mean number by   Further, let   be the long run or E[C]. Pn
stationary probability that there are   citizens in the government shop. In words,   tells us the nP n
probability, as time approaches infinity, that there are exactly   citizens in the government shop. n
Now, if   represents the number of citizens in the government shop at some arbitrary time   then Y(t) t,
mathematically we have
(1) Pn'limt64Prob{Y(t)'n}, n'0,1,2,...








Inspection of equation (2) tells us that for this equation to make sense, we must have   In words, λ<µ.
the arrival rate of citizens at the government shop cannot be larger than the rate at which bread is sold
to citizens by the corrupt public official. Equation (2) also provides us with the answer to the question
we posed in the beginning of the paragraph before equation (1). Specifically, the expected benefit to
the corrupt government official in monetary units per citizen—or the benefit from bribery—equals
the ratio of the citizen arrival rate   to the difference between the bread provision rate and the citizen λ
arrival rate    (µ&λ).
Simple comparative statics exercises tell us that   and that   These ME[C]/Mλ>0 ME[C]/Mµ<0.
results conform well with our intuition about the actual impact of bribery. Specifically, the first result
says that if the rate   at which citizens come to the government shop increases, then the average λ
monetary benefit to our corrupt government official goes up. In contrast, raising the rate   at which µ
the venal public official sells bread has a negative impact on this official’s average monetary benefit
from bribery per citizen. We now proceed to analyze balking behavior in the context of the model
described in section 2.
4. The Model With Balking
As in section 3, citizens arrive at the government shop in accordance with a Poisson process
with rate   and the relevant public official sells bread to citizens at rate   Obviously, citizens who λ µ.
upon arrival find no queue in the government shop proceed to purchase their bread right away. Now,
to focus on the balking aspect of the story, we suppose that an arriving citizen who finds the public
official busy does not linger in the shop but, instead, roams around the government shop for an
exponentially distributed amount of time with rate   He then returns to the shop. If the public official θ.7
In a more general model, one could endogenize our citizen’s decision regarding whether to wait in queue or to go instead to a private
shop. Such a general model would involve the analysis of a priority queuing model—such as the M/G/1 model—with at least two
(more and less impatient) types of citizens. Batabyal and Yoo (2004, 2005) have analyzed such priority queuing models and it
should be possible to use the modeling techniques employed in these two papers to shed light on the questions that we are analyzing
in the present paper. 
8
For more on these balance equations, see Ross (2003, pp. 481-483) and Hillier and Lieberman (2005, pp. 782-784).
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is still busy upon his return then our citizen repeats the above course of action and then returns to the
shop again, and so on and so forth. An impatient citizen wanting bread who finds the government
official busy and   other citizens roaming around the shop balks. In other words, he refuses to also n
roam around the government shop. As an alternative, this citizen leaves the government shop and
goes instead to a private shop to purchase his bread. 
Following the explanation in the second paragraph of section 3, we remind the reader that in
this balking model, the issue from the standpoint of our citizen is not one of speed of service only.
It is one of speed of service combined with the possible non-receipt of bread. In addition, although
it is possible that the government shop may end up with unsold bread, we do not consider this
possibility very likely. After all, only very impatient and relatively more wealthy citizens will want to
purchase bread at the generally more expensive private shop. Finally, note that we have modeled,
albeit in a preliminary way, the situation in which our citizen does not wait in the government shop.
As explained in the previous paragraph, when this citizen finds the government official busy and n
other citizens roaming around the shop, he balks. That is, he refuses to also roam around the
government shop and he goes instead to the private shop to purchase bread.
7
Given the description in the previous two paragraphs, our task now is to answer the two
remaining questions that we identified in section 1: First, what proportion of all citizens are eventually
able to buy bread? Second, what is the expected amount of time a citizen spends roaming around the
government shop, waiting to buy bread? Let us begin our analysis of these two questions by first
defining the states of the model with balking. To this end, let   denote the number of citizens who i
are being sold bread by the government official and let   denote the number of citizens who are j
roaming around the government shop. Then, from the delineation of events in the previous two
paragraphs, it follows that   and that   With this information, we can now think of the i'0,1, 0#j#n.
state of our model as the pair    (i,j).
To answer the question about the proportion of all citizens who are eventually able to buy
bread, we will have to specify the so called balance equations.





Inspecting equations (3)-(5) carefully, the reader will note that   is the stationary probability that P(1,n)
the government official is busy selling bread and that   citizens are roaming around the government n
shop. In other words,   is the probability of balking or, alternately, the proportion of all citizens P(1,n)
who are unable to buy bread from the government shop. Therefore, the proportion of all citizens who
are eventually able to buy bread from the government shop is given by
(6) 1&P(1,n)'{µ&λP(0,n)}/µ.
We have just answered the second question of this paper. As one would expect, equation (6)
tells us that an increase in the citizen arrival rate   and the public official’s bread provision rate  λ µ
have opposite impacts on the proportion of all citizens who are eventually able to buy bread from the
government shop. In particular, as   goes up, the proportion of interest   goes down. λ 1&P(1,n)
Conversely, when   goes up, the same proportion   goes up. We now proceed to answer the µ1 &P(1,n)
third and final question of this paper.
To reiterate, we would now like to ascertain the expected amount of time a citizen spends
roaming around the government shop, waiting to buy bread. To undertake this exercise, let us use
the notation of section 3 and first compute the mean number of citizens in the government shop or E[C].
Some thought tells us that in this section’s model with balking
(7) E[C]'Σ(œi,j)(i%j)P(i,j).
Now, using Little’s formula or equation 8.2 in Ross (2003, p. 478), we can deduce that the average
time spent by a citizen in the government shop or   is given by E[T]
(8) E[T]'E[C]/[λ{1&P(1,n)}]'[Σ(œi,j)(i%j)P(i,j)]/[λ{1&P(1,n)}].
With equation (8) in place, let us denote the expected amount of time a citizen spends roaming
around the government shop by   Then, from Hillier and Lieberman (2005, p. 771) we get E[TRA].
(9) E[TRA]'E[T]&1/µ,
where   is given by equation (8).  E[T]
Equation (9) tells us that if one is concerned about reducing the amount of time citizens
spend, presumably unproductively, roaming around the government shop then the most obvious way
to do so would be to decrease the rate   at which the public official sells bread to citizens. µ
Alternately, one could also attain the above result by increasing the number of public officials working
in the government shop under study. This completes our analysis of the third and final question of this
paper.7
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a theoretical perspective on the properties of queue based resource
allocation mechanisms in the presence of government and private shops. In particular, we
accomplished three objectives. First, in the presence of bribery, we determined the expected monetary
benefit per citizen to the corrupt government official. Second, in the presence of balking, we
ascertained the proportion of all citizens who are eventually able to buy bread from the government
shop. Finally, and once again in the presence of balking, we computed the average amount of time
a citizen spends roaming around the government shop, waiting to buy bread. 
The preliminary analysis of this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In
what follows, we propose two plausible extensions. First, we analyzed three specific questions in the
context of a Markovian queuing model. Therefore, it would be useful to explore how robust our
findings are by studying the kinds of resource allocation questions that we have examined in this
paper with more general priority queuing models of the sort analyzed in Batabyal and Yoo (2004,
2005). Second, it would be useful to investigate queuing models in which there is interaction between
citizens while they wait in queue to purchase bread. One way to model this interaction would be to
specify that citizens arrive at the government shop in accordance with a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process with a particular intensity function. By modeling the arrival process in this way, we would
allow for the possibility that events—pertaining to the purchase of bread—may be more likely to
occur at certain times than at other times. Studies that analyze these aspects of the problem will
increase our understanding of the properties of queue based resource allocation mechanisms.8
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